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ABSTRACT
The attacks of September 11, 2001, put terrorism at the forefront of the American
political landscape. Donald Trump played into these fears of terrorism through his
political rhetoric during his presidency, particularly targeting international
students as “threats” to the nation. However, we argue that the labeling of
international students as security threats was not started after 9/11 nor invented
by Trump. Through historical records and accounts across decades of policies
related to this issue, we seek to answer two questions: How has the U.S.
government monitored visa policies and programs for international students?
How have U.S. national policies evolved to view international students as national
security threats? We found that mistrust of this population has been embedded
throughout U.S. immigration history and that federal tracking policies emerged
incrementally from long-held security concerns. The essay closes with a
discussion on why the entire population of international students should not be
scapegoated due to these fears.
Keywords: higher education, international students, migration, policy studies,
security
The United States has had a paradoxical relationship with international students,
viewing them as both important talents but also as suspicious threats. According
to a recent report published by the American Council on Education
175

Ryan M. Allen & Krishna Bista
([ACE] 2021), 41% of American voters believed that some international students
in the United States were threats to various sectors, from security to innovation
(p. 29). Meanwhile, Fischer (2021) wrote, “Despite the isolationist, pull-up-thebridges rhetoric of the past four years [of the Donald Trump presidency], public
attitudes toward international students have been warming, with Americans
saying their presence on college campuses increases global understanding and
improves U.S. competitiveness” (para. 1). There is much concern that the scrutiny
of the Trump era has done lasting damage to international students in the country
(see Allen & Ye, 2021; Castiello-Gutiérrez & Li, 2020; Lee & Haupt, 2021; RoseRedwood & Rose-Redwood, 2017; Streitwieser et al., 2020). Given this paradox,
it is worthwhile to look back at the history of these students and the policies
surrounding them to understand what the future might hold. With the importance
of international students but also the scrutiny placed on this population, this essay
is guided by two questions: How has the U.S. government monitored visa policies
and programs for international students? How have U.S. national policies evolved
to view international students as national security threats?
This historical research uses both primary documents and secondary accounts
related to how terrorist threats have been associated with international students (see
Marius & Page, 2015). The primary source documents include Congressional
reports, government documents or memos, newspaper articles, and organizational
records, while the secondary sourcing comes from scholarly articles, law reviews,
and book accounts from the various eras. Following similar designs (Cameron,
2006; Kim, 2009; Stein & McCartney, 2021), the purposeful selection of these
materials allowed contextualization through a historiography of international
students in the United States and the policies surrounding them, interconnecting the
population with the security sector. With this type of historical approach, Marius
and Page (2015) argued that the results should not simply be an “encyclopedia
whose aim is to give nothing but facts” (p. 14). Instead, the design should provide
broader contextualization for an argument through the piecing together of various
sources to paint a more complete picture. From this approach, the current essay
challenges the notion that the attacks on September 11 of 2001 birthed the tracking
measures and illustrates how the scrutiny that foreign students faced under the
Trump administration has been a part of a longer American tradition.
RECENT DISCOURSE ON INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS
IN THE UNITED STATES
According to the Institute of International Education (IIE, 2020), there were over
a million international students pursuing degrees in American colleges and
universities in 2019–2020. Each year, this student population contributes at least
$44.7 billion to the U.S. economy. About 25% of the most innovative American
companies, such as Intel (founder Andy Grove, Hungary), eBay (Pierre Omidyar,
France), Yahoo! (Jerry Yang, Taiwan), and Google (Sergey Brin, Russia), were
started by former international students who graduated from American colleges
and universities (Bista, 2020). Today, there are at least 13.5 million people
employed in U.S. Fortune 500 companies, and 101 of these Fortune 500
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companies were started by foreign-born individuals, with another 122 founded by
the children of immigrants (New American Economy [NAE], 2019). International
students dominate in the science, technology, engineering, mathematics, and
medicine (STEMM) fields, and many tech giants were the top employers of
international students in 2018–2019, including Amazon (employing 2,911
international students), Integra (2,081), Intel (1,348), Google (1,193), Microsoft
(867), Deloitte (747), Facebook (725), IMB (628), Cisco (411), and eBay (350;
Bier, 2020).
On July 6, 2020, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
announced that it would terminate the visa of international students currently
studying at U.S. colleges and universities that do not offer in-person classes due
to the COVID-19 pandemic (Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE], 2020;
Nowrasteh, 2020). ICE claimed national security was a major concern if students
take only online classes, stating, “Over the past two decades, Congress has
repeatedly stressed the importance of monitoring nonimmigrant students noting
national security concerns” (Nowrasteh, 2020). In response to this announcement,
more than 200 colleges and universities signed court briefs against the Donald
Trump administration supporting Harvard University and Massachusetts Institute
of Technology as they sued ICE (Binkley, 2020). These policies were particularly
worrying for universities and educators, as Streitwieser et al. (2020) argued, “In
the Trump era, we have witnessed a particularly intense and extreme
manifestation of securitization politics, which has prompted an explosion of
activity by the HEI [higher education institution] sector on behalf of affected
students” (p. 421). Already prior to 2020, the sector had already seen a drop in
international students, which scholars dubbed the “Trump Effect” (RoseRedwood & Rose-Redwood, 2017).
The higher education sector was specifically caught up in the growing
distrust, as foreign students who had come from abroad to fill American
universities were perceived as possible national security threats. Lee and Haupt
(2021) argued, “Decoupling science from politics, supporting scientific inquiry,
and encouraging cross-border investigations are obvious steps, but also
challenging when science becomes a matter of national security (i.e., scientific
nationalism)” (p. 324). This kind of scientific nationalism can manifest mistrust
against certain groups of foreign students or scholars, especially in sensitive areas.
Scholars have illustrated targets on various groups, such as Chinese students
during the COVID-19 pandemic (Allen & Ye, 2021), Muslim students after the
9/11 attacks (Anderson, 2020), and Iranian students in the 1970s (Reimers, 1992).
Higher education stakeholders have warned that demonizing foreign policy risks
onto students is dehumanizing (Castiello-Gutiérrez & Li, 2020). Indeed, years
before the election of Trump, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11)
shocked the world, forever impacting American domestic, foreign, and
educational policy. The entire American society was altered after that day: travel,
media, international relations, and politics. The nation witnessed a rise in racism
and xenophobia. Gallup (2019) reported a sharp increase in American’s fears of
terrorism, which has persisted over time. More pressing, Haner et al. (2019) found
that half of Americans lived with some level of fear of an attack and that these
177

Ryan M. Allen & Krishna Bista
sentiments were associated with support for anti-immigrant policies, especially
regarding Muslim populations.
The U.S. government seemingly responded to several of the attackers gaining
entrance into the country on student visas by beginning to track all foreign
students entering the country through a centralized database, known as Student
and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS; Siskin, 2005). However, when
viewed from a longer historical approach, we argue that the tracking system
emerged incrementally, rather than from what is known as a punctuated
equilibrium or policy window (Peters, 2019). There were some higher education
stakeholders who questioned if U.S. higher education could ever be the same after
the installation of such a system due to its unwelcoming nature and bureaucratic
impediments (Arroyo, 2002; Johnson, 2004; Obst & Forster, 2011), similar to the
recent Trump Effect concerns (Rose-Redwood & Rose-Redwood, 2017). While
the numbers of international students in the United States did rise, reaching record
levels (Alberts, 2007; Altbach, 2004), the sentiments of the population as a threat
remained. The Trump administration only played into these existing fears in
multiple ways, such as nativist rhetoric of outsiders taking jobs from Americans
or unfounded scrutiny of terrorism. While the former isolationist rhetoric warrants
study, this research centers on the latter contention of the terrorist threat. This
historical approach will illustrate the incremental coupling of international
students and American fears of terrorism, long before the 9/11 attacks or Trump’s
presidency. The article is organized in the following sections: beginnings to the
suspicion of this population, attaching the threat of terrorism, and contextualizing
the attacks on 9/11 to the tracking system. We close with a discussion of the
repercussion to the current discourse on international students and scholars in the
United States.
Early Tracking of International Students in the United States
The United States has long had immigration policies that have impacted
foreign students, as outlined in this section and summarized in Table 1. The
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 was the first immigration ban based on racial or
ethnic considerations, barring most Chinese from entering or naturalizing, but the
ban still allowed the entry of some foreign students (Allen & Liu, 2016). Indeed,
American colleges accepted a growing number of Chinese students over this
period, often related to missionary endeavors. The Immigration Act of 1924,
though, was the first federal policy allowing international student admittance into
the United States. Although the United States already had minimal student
exchanges prior to this act, its passage marked the first recognized national policy
on international students (Haddal, 2007). The U.S. federal government continued
to expand its presence into this burgeoning sector for the next 70 years.
At the closing of World War II, the United States established the Fulbright
Program, its global flagship student and researcher outreach, recruitment, and
exchange program. While the program helped to popularize international students

178

Journal of International Students
on U.S. university campuses, it also drew derision from those concerned about
Soviet influence on American education (Vestal & Leestma, 1994). After World
War II, returning veterans took advantage of the G.I. Bill, leading to a
massification effect that ballooned the entire higher education sector, in general.
Likewise, the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 targeted immigration from warravaged European countries, but initially held limitations that restricted Jewish
entrants (Dinnerstein, 1981). At the same time, elite American universities were
looking to “reduce the number of Jewish students” (Dinnerstein, 1981, p. 136).
Throughout the 1950s, the Federal Government was the largest economic
contributor in the international student sector, and it centralized operations
through a non-governmental organization, the Institute of International Education.
Even as the United States battled the USSR in an ideological Cold War throughout
the world, this period saw the initial questioning of the growing foreign student
population on college campuses (Du Bois, 1956).
Table 1: Timeline of Early International Students and Federal Immigration
Policy
Date

Policy

Context

1882

Chinese Exclusion
Act

The first federal immigration policy based
on national origin exclusion, though it did
provide a provision for students.

1924

Immigration Act of
1924

The act dramatically capped the number of
foreign emigres to the United States,
especially limiting to non-Western
European nations.

1946

Fulbright Program

The flagship public diplomacy effort
normalized international scholars and
students at high levels in U.S. universities.

1948

Displaced Persons
Act of 1948

A program that targeted immigration from
post-World War II Europe, but with
limitations to the Jewish population.

1965

Immigration and
Nationality Act of
1965

Opened the caps on foreigners established
in 1924 and expanded higher education
offerings, with inclusion of international
student language.

Higher Education
Act (HEA) of 1965
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In the 1960s, policymakers were still attempting to make sense of the
increasing flow of students from abroad, as the sector was still maturing. With the
passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, the strict racial and ethnic
quotes from previous Acts were nullified, opening the door for more international
students (Pub. L. 89–236, 1965). In the 1964 publication, The Foreign Student:
Whom Shall We Welcome, stakeholders in the sector were brought together by
Education and World Affairs, a private American nonprofit organization, to
discuss the discourse surrounding American policies on international students
(Harari, 1964). The publication especially focused on admissions for this student
population. One recommendation from this mid-1960s publication suggested
better mechanisms for screening foreign students. “We are convinced in principle
of the need and value of establishing a limited number of informal and screening
mechanisms overseas for the unsponsored foreign students… who are likely to
continue to account for the dominant portion of our total foreign student
population,” the report stated (Harris, 1964, p. 20).
While it does not explicitly state that the U.S. government should be the organizer
of this mechanism, it does give early credence to the centralized screening
process.
Concurrently, the passage of the Higher Education Act (HEA) of 1965 also
considered the issue of tracking students. Section 134 of the HEA of 1965
explicitly prohibits a federal database that tracks all U.S. university students, but
it does allow exceptions for states to create tracking systems for their own students
(Pub. L. 89–329, 1965). This tracking section, though, makes no mention of
foreign students. However, the Act does directly reference foreign students in a
brief section that covers tuition from international students. It states that
institutions have a legal right to create policies that guarantee foreign nationals
will pay for tuition, though there is no connection to U.S. foreign policy. The
HEA’s central focus is exclusively a domestic-focused policy, barely mentioning
international education.
ATTACHING A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS
Around a decade after the passage of the HEA and as early as 1972, international
students drew scrutiny for being possible critical national security concerns from
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and other government entities
(Eldridge et al., 2004). But it was the Iran Hostage Crisis of 1979 that truly
sparked apprehension of this population. During the crisis, Jimmy Carter
(Democrat) and his administration scrambled to find Iranian or other perceived
radicalized students from around the world that were in the United States on
student visas (Reimers, 1992). Iranian students across the country were forced to
undergo visa reviews and interviews as captured in various campus newspapers
(see Bowling Green State University [BGSU], 1979; California Polytechnic State
University [CPSU], 1979; Eastern Kentucky University [EKU], 1979). However,
the administration was shocked to learn that the INS did not know how many
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students were in the country or where they even were (Reimers, 1992). While no
national tracking system was established after the realization, a crude,
nonmandatory reporting mechanism for universities called the Student and
Schools System (STSC) was put into place for visa management (U.S.
Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General [U.S. DJOIG], 2003). It
marked the first instance where the executive branch pushed intelligence agencies
to interrogate this population at large as possible national security threats.
Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush (both Republicans), his Vice
President and former head of CIA, carried over the same concerns for
unaccounted foreign students, especially from Middle East nations. In 1984, upon
intelligence that Muammar Gaddafi may have sent assassins to the United States
disguised as foreign students, every Libyan student was tracked down and
fingerprinted, which was the first official nationwide international tracking
project of its kind by the federal government (Eldridge et al., 2004). During this
time, the INS attempted to track all student visa entrants via the STSC, but because
tracking the students by paper was too cumbersome and the amount of paperwork
received by the office was massive, the attempt ended in failure. It was even
proposed that the educational institutions bear the burden of tracking this student
population, foreshadowing the future mechanism that was later put into place
(Reimers, 1992). The technology of the 1970s and 1980s simply did not allow for
the kind of system desired. In accordance, a 1999 report posited that the United
States would not have the technical capabilities to implement a nationwide foreign
student tracking system until 2003 (Orbach, 1999).
In 1993, the World Trade Centers were the target of a terrorist attack that
marked the dawn of domestic terrorist attacks in the modern United States, as a
truck containing a makeshift bomb was detonated in the parking garage of the
towers, killing six people and injuring hundreds more (Lu, 2008). The U.S.
government quickly uncovered the culprits and found that they were all either of
Middle Eastern descent or Muslim, several of whom were in the country legally
through asylum or tourist visas, while two of the attackers were American citizens
(Farnam, 2005). It was later discovered that one of the attackers had come to the
United States on a student visa, overstaying his visa expiration date. Despite only
one out of the small group of attackers being in the United States on a student
visa, foreign student entry to the country was moved to the forefront of security
concerns within the intelligence community. In 1994, FBI Director Louis Freeh,
who served under both the Republican George H.W. Bush and Democrat Bill
Clinton presidential administrations, called for a reexamination of international
student visa policies because of potential security threats (Wasem, 2002). A task
force was created to examine Freeh’s concerns, auditing the entire process of
international student entry in the United States. The FBI realized that the INS was
not tracking international student addresses or even keeping current records on
the sector. Upon this review, the agency insisted on international student visa
policy reform, but another domestic terrorist attack helped to move the scrutiny
away from international students soon after.
Even when incidents had no relation to foreign students, the security
apparatus remained suspicious of the population. In 1995, a makeshift bomb was
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loaded into a Ryder truck and detonated in front of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people and injuring several hundred more,
which at the time, was the deadliest terrorist attack in U.S. history. Despite initial
conjecture of Islamic terrorism, similar to that of the 1993 World Trade Center
attacks, the perpetrators were right-wing, Christian, White, and domestically born
Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols (Benjamin & Simon, 2003). The FBI
established the largest task force since the John F. Kennedy assassination to
investigate the bombing, geared toward domestic right-wing antigovernment
groups (Hamm, 1997). The attacks forced the agency to remove some resources
away from foreign terrorist threats, including international students, but the
scrutiny on this population did not disappear. Prompted by the investigation into
the Oklahoma City bombing, the FBI attempted to gather information on students
they deemed as potential threats via the INS STSC, but the records had not been
updated since 1988. The obsolescence set off alarm bells with some federal
agencies, according to an interview with Morrie Berez, a senior officer in the
Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, in a report for the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (NCTAUUS, 2003).
CIPRIS Pilot System
Although the domestic terrorist attacks partially subdued the fervor to
connect international students with terrorism, moving significant resources
toward domestic right-wing militias, the discovery that INS could not readily
provide information about students concerned the intelligence apparatus. Director
Freeh had put in motion the creation of another task force to reexamine student
visa policies, along with other immigration and national security issues,
comprising INS, the United States Information Agency (USIA), the Department
of State, and a few educators too. The group called the “Task Force on Foreign
Student Controls” soon recommended the creation of a federal tracking system
for international students (Miyokawa, 2009). In 1996, following the group’s
recommendation, Congress overwhelmingly passed the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) with bipartisan support,
including strong praise from President Clinton. The act had an explicit purpose of
tightening immigration restrictions and giving the Federal Government greater
control in the sector by increasing enforcement mechanisms used by various
agencies seeking to rein in immigration (Porter, 2011)
Before the IIRIRA, all of the sponsoring agencies (schools, universities, etc.)
were already required to manage visa documents for students entering the country
(either an I-20 or DS-2019) under STSC, meaning the data already existed for
tracking the population, but there was no centralized database. As opposed to
other types of visitors entering for other means like business or tourism, tracking
all foreign students was actually feasible given the proper resources and focus
(Farnam, 2005). With the passage of the Act, international students were
explicitly targeted in Section 641, entitled Program to Collect Information
Relating to Non-Immigrant Foreign Students and Other Exchange Program
Participants (Pub. L. 104–208, 1996). This section stated that the Attorney
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General, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Education would collaborate to
create a tracking system for persons entering the country on F (student), J
(exchange), and M (vocational school) visas. The program was directed to track
the following categories: American addresses, visa entrance and expiration dates,
academic records, part-time/ full-time status, and criminal convictions. The act
explicitly stated that this data collection was not illegal under the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, as the targets were noncitizen
entrants.
Part of the implementation process stated that the government should
incorporate or improve current “computer software” to track the data and that,
where possible, the information should be stored electronically, hence a database
(Pub. L. 104–208, 1996). By this time, technological advances made the tracking
system a reality, fixing key barriers from the failed attempt in the 1980s. The
initial pilot phase was created and began implementation by January 1, 1998,
mandated under IIRIRA. Any institution that issued student visas had to follow
the guidelines as set out in the Act or risk losing visa-granting status, meaning
that any university that wanted to continue enrolling international students had to
be compliant. To help fund the program, a $100 fee was also enacted for all
international students applying for a U.S. visa, which provided serious discontent
from the educational sector when introduced (Miyokawa, 2009).
The government agency tasked with the creation and implementation of the
tracking system was the INS. However, the agency’s chief concern was illegal
immigration and economic issues with the inflow of foreigners coming to the
United States, and not with the terrorist threat paradigm (Benjamin & Simon,
2003). When the governmental division under the Justice Department began the
tracking system creation process, there was no urgency around the program and
the lead for the project went to Berez. Despite continued defunding for the agency,
Berez and INS formed a task force that dreamed up a computerized system that
would track all foreign students coming in and out of any American educational
institution, which could be cross-referenced by consulates or other federal
agencies (Eldridge et al., 2004).
In 1997, the INS launched and began operating a pilot program for the
envisioned tracking system, which was called the Coordinated Interagency
Partnership Regulating International Students (CIPRIS). However, due to budget
constraints, CIPRIS was only tested at 21 higher education institutions, in four
states (Georgia, Alabama, North Carolina, and South Carolina), and in
conjunction with the Atlanta Hartsfield Airport and the Texas Service Center
(Cronin, 2001). After this initial pilot phase, the program was expected to expand
nationally by January 1, 2002, but to only a select few countries with the
expectation that the pool would later be expanded after a review and feasibility
report (Orbach, 1999). While Orbach (1999) suspected the countries targeted
would be from the Middle East, that part of the plan was never implemented. The
IIRIRA stipulated that a fully operationalized nationwide tracking system should
be in place, including every international student entering the United States, by
January 1, 2003.
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The CIPRIS pilot program officially ended in October of 1999, and some
point to the backlash from critics, who viewed the tracking of international
students as a violation of civil liberties, as one reason for its suspension (Benjamin
& Simon, 2003; Malkin, 2002). However, Michael Cronin, Acting Executive
Associate Commissioner for the Office of Programs at INS in the early 2000s,
countered the theory that the program was ended because of opponents, saying
that CIPRIS was never intended to be long-term, and it was only a “throw-away”
program designed to test the feasibility of a future nationwide system (Cronin,
2001). The pilot system did indeed work as tested and had the capabilities of being
scaled across the United States. In the early 2000s, the INS was devising an
expansion of the system that would cover the entire country for all incoming
international students as stipulated by IIRIRA (Eldridge et al., 2004).
Student Tracking Expansion and Pushback
The Counterterrorism Security Group and the National Security Agency had
long discussed foreign students and security issues, but it was a problem too large
to realistically solve (Benjamin & Simon, 2003). Solutions had to be proven
feasible in order to get support from these agencies. Aside from feasibility, the
political attention brought on by educational interest groups worried these
agencies as well (Miyokawa, 2009). One interest group that played a significant
role in the opposition to the system was NAFSA: Association of International
Educators, a group dedicated to international education and exchanges. Marlene
Johnson, the organization’s executive director, personally talked about getting
Berez removed from leading CIPRIS. The nonprofit also hired lobbyist Victor
Johnson to condemn the program (Benjamin & Simon, 2003; Malkin, 2002).
“There is no evidence that foreign students constitute a terrorism threat” and
“there is no reason to single them out,” said Johnson (as cited in Malkin, 2002, p.
71). Pushed by NAFSA and other supporters, in early 2000, 21 U.S. Senators
requested that INS delay the nationwide rollout of the system and that the $100
be picked up by the agency. With the pressure, Berez was removed from the
project before the national tracking system was unveiled (Benjamin & Simon,
2003; Malkin, 2002).
Despite contestation from the education sector, supporters were still pushing
for the pilot program’s expansion into a nationwide operational database for all
international students entering the United States. The “Countering the Changing
Threat of International Terrorism: Report of The National Commission on
Terrorism,” submitted to the U.S. Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations in
June of 2000, showed strong support from federal agencies and other high-ranking
conservative officials, including Bob Barr (Republican, Georgia), John Ashcroft
(Attorney General under Bush), and James Sensenbrenner (Republican,
Wisconsin). Accordingly, a congressional research report from February 2001
supported the expansion and described how the future system would allow the
government to flag students who might drop out or who suddenly change their
field of study to sensitive areas, directly citing the World Trade Center attacks
from 1993 (Perl, 2001). The report did note that Congress was concerned with
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protecting civil liberties but believed that combating terrorist threats overruled the
impact rights of noncitizens. In July of 2001, INS announced that, in conjunction
with partner federal agencies, a new tracking system would be rolled out on the
national level, based on lessons learned from CIPRIS and feedback from relevant
stakeholders (Cronin, 2001). Because this system would be national, the agency
decided to change the name from CIPRIS to the Student and Exchange Visitor
Program (SEVP) and the online system would be known as SEVIS.
The new SEVIS program began implementation at only 11 Boston-based
institutions, with aggressive plans for national expansion, as all F, J, and M visas
would be incorporated into the system progressively (Cronin, 2001). It was
unclear why Boston was chosen, as the previous pilot sites were located in the
South. Cronin, in the official SEVIS announcement, did not state any firm
expansion dates and noted that higher education institutions were already aware
of the coming changes, but that the public would be notified as the system
expanded. The announced SEVIS program was based on the pilot CIPRIS
precursor and had much of the envisioned functions as described in the IIRIRA
of 1996 and even earlier conceptions of foreign student tracking in the United
States (Eldridge et al., 2004; Farnam, 2005; Wasem, 2002).
Unsurprisingly, there was considerable pushback from the educational
coalition. In a public response letter to the tracking system sent to Kevin Rooney,
Acting Commissioner of INS, the American Council on Education, representing
a wide range of institutions and organizations from across the United States, laid
out opposition to the announced expansion and reformed SEVIS program
(Haddal, 2007; Wasem, 2002). The letter explained how the policy could hurt the
educational sector, listing the timetable of implementation as unfeasible, citing
the $12.3 billion industry built around the international students, and adding that
the policy and new fees would deter student mobility to the United States. The
letter was sent around the leading associations and institutions in higher
education, including National Association of Independent Colleges and
Universities, National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges,
NAFSA, Association of Community College Trustees, Association of American
Universities, Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities, and American
Association of Presidents of Independent Colleges and Universities.
In August 2001, Representative Betty McCollum (Democrat, Minnesota)
introduced a bill that would have repealed Section 641 of IIRAIRA, the student
tracking section. NAFSA immediately showed its support for the repeal with a
press release lauding the repeal bill (Miyokawa, 2009). Despite support from
NAFSA, early analysis of the bill from Dan Curry of The Chronicle of Higher
Education suggested that it did not have much of a chance to pass. “Outlook: Not
great. The bill has only five cosponsors, all Democrats,” wrote Curry on
September 7, 2001, also pointing out that there was no companion bill in the
Senate, meaning that it faced a difficult challenge to become law due to the
bicameral nature of the U.S. Federal Government. On September 10, the bill
would quietly move to the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims of the
House of Representative for discussion. The bill was never publicly mentioned
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again, as the following day the United States faced its most deadly attack in 60
years.
HOW 9/11 IMPACTED THE TRACKING OF
INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS
On September 11, 2001, the United States was forever changed by the terrorist
attacks on the World Trade Centers and the Pentagon, with national security
moving to the forefront of the American consciousness (Altbach, 2004). Hijackers
took control of flights and flew their aircrafts into targets in New York and
Washington, D.C., with one flight downed in remote Pennsylvania. Almost 3,000
people died in the attacks, with thousands more injured. The national mood
oscillated between anger, sadness, and confusion (Reese, 2005). The investigation
revealed that several attackers were in the United States on student visas, with a
few enrolled in small flight schools learning to pilot aircraft. Sweeping changes
were made to a multitude of policies in the name of protecting the country from
another terrorist attack, including the creation of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS; Arroyo, 2002).
Because of the student visa connection, international students drew frenzy
from many across the nation, from both conservative and liberal positions. Within
weeks of the attacks, Dianne Feinstein (Democrat, California) was shocked to
learn that INS could not tell her the status of around 16,000 international students
in her state of California and she immediately called for a moratorium on all
student visas until the government could properly assess each student entering the
country, echoing earlier calls from previous attacks and coming with bipartisan
support (Malkin, 2002; Reeves, 2005). Fanning the flames further, months after
the terrorist attacks, two of the perpetrators had their student visas renewed,
despite being dead and known terrorists, an error that put more pressure on getting
SEVIS operational (Farnam, 2005; Reeves, 2005). The pressures put the spotlight
firmly onto the international student admissions process in the United States.
After the attacks, the momentum for rolling out the federal tracking system
could not be hindered, as even the staunch opponents against SEVIS stepped aside
to allow full implementation. NAFSA gave up its opposition and released a
statement of support: “We no longer oppose the foreign student tracking system
that is being implemented by the INS. The time for debate on this matter is over
and the time to devise a considered response to terrorism has arrived” (quoted in
Farnam, 2005, p. 105). The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, passed in October of
that year with bipartisan support, guaranteed the rollout of the full tracking
system, with funding from the Department of Justice and a mandate of
implementation by January 1, 2003 (Siskin, 2005). The original pilot tracking
program was used to establish a nationwide system to track students at every U.S.
educational institution, and the modern SEVIS system was born. By December
11, 2002, the system was fully operational to track all international students,
which happened to coincide with the pre-9/11 deadline for the system. By August
1, 2003, all institutions had to enter their remaining foreign students into the
system or else lose their visa-granting status (Wasem, 2002). Thus, the United
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States would, from that point forward, electronically track all international
students entering the country on F, J, or M visas in a centralized database under
both the DHS and Department of State (U.S. DHS, 2012).
There were clear challenges for the new system. Retraining efforts, technical
issues, and program reorganization were reported across the U.S. higher
educational landscape (Kless, 2004). Further, despite some opponents dropping
opposition, there were still criticisms that the foreign students were being
scapegoated and that nativist perceptions would deter students from coming to the
country. The sector did witness a slight drop in international students the academic
years following the SEVIS deadline, and some argued that the nation would never
again be a global leader in international student destinations (Arroyo, 2002;
Johnson, 2004). Despite any of the concerns or glitches in the implementation of
the nationwide tracking system, the sector eventually normalized and foreign
students continued to flow into the nation at record levels only a few years after
it was institutionalized (Connell, 2005). Some scholars argued that the decrease
in international students was just one of many issues, not simply the new SEVIS
program (Alberts, 2007; Altbach, 2004).
Table 2: The Coupling of National Security and International Students
Date

Event

Context

1979–1981

Iran hostage crisis

U.S. government officials were
shocked to discover they could not
track where Iranian international
students were studying. INS
established STSC.

1984

Muammar Gaddafi
sends assassins to the
U.S. disguised as
students

Libyan students in the country were
all targeted for fingerprinting, but
the STSC proved too crude and
cumbersome for tracking.

1993

1993 World Trade
Center attacks

One of the several attackers entered
the US on a student visa, prompting
concern from the federal
government.

1995

Oklahoma City
bombing

While foreign attackers were
initially suspected, the right-wing
perpetrators put some national
security focus on domestic
terrorism. Intelligence agencies
prompted to reexamine STSC.
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Date

Event

Context

1996

CIPRIS pilot
established

This pilot program to track
international students was created
and tested, providing the foundation
for the future system.

2001

9/11 terrorist attacks

Given the severity and because
several of the attackers were
foreign students, the concerns as
international students received
widespread support.

USA PATRIOT Act
of 2001
2003

SEVIS system
compliance deadline

The final implementation of the
tracking system expanded and
mandated across the nation,
realizing aspirations decades in the
making.

Note: INS = Immigration and Naturalization Service; STSC = Student and
Schools System.
Currently, under DHS and the Department of State, the SEVIS system tracks
over a million international students entering and moving about in the United
States. Without the CIPRIS pilot system, just one key incremental step, it is
unlikely that SEVIS would have been fully in place in 2003, which was not even
two full years after 9/11. Illustrated in Table 2, there was neither one major policy
shift nor a total moratorium on international students in the country due to the
growing coupling of national security concerns with international students, with
historical roots going back to the 1970s and before.
DISCUSSION AND REPERCUSSIONS
Educators and institutions have advocated against the increased scrutiny of
international students in the name of national security by the federal government
(Streitwieser et al., 2020). The fears of international students and their perceived
connections to policy change via terrorism stem beyond the election of 2016;
these sentiments of distrust also go back well before 9/11. When considering a
larger historical narrative, the origins of an international student tracking system
were built incrementally from policies much earlier than the perceived timing
after 9/11. Concerns for keeping track of possible security threats from this
population dates to the 1970s and before, connecting to anti-Chinese and antiSemitic aspects of American history, rather than one specific so-called “punctured
equilibrium” (Peters, 2019). Furthermore, the presence of the pilot phase project
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and other tracking attempts shows that there was an incremental development
process toward the current SEVIS database policy. Even with opposition from
groups such as NAFSA, it is unclear whether they would have had enough
political clout to stop the eventual rollout from the security apparatus. Casting
aside conjecture, the implementation of the system aligns to CIPRIS and the
replacement planned scaled national implementation.
It is surmised that the technical feasibility of tracking all international
students in the United States was potentially the true barrier, as the Carter
administration through Clinton struggled with implementation under INS and
other federal agencies, but the barriers also go beyond simple innovation. The
attacks on 9/11 coincided with the proliferation of technology that more easily
allowed for a central database, allowing DHS to quickly scale up the CIPRIS pilot
program nationwide. Indeed, technological innovations of the last few decades
have allowed for more tracking, surveillance, and quantification, especially in
terms of national security (Arroyo, 2002; Haner et al., 2019). Yet, there are
differences in the way that international students are suspected through a tracking
system rooted in mistrust compared to those of business class visitors or other
types of travelers. There will always be a segment of right-wing nativists who
distrust all outsiders, regardless of visa type. However, other segments of the
population with more liberal stances on immigration and outsiders have
seemingly accepted the coupling of international students and security, as aspects
of tracking chronicled in this essay have seen bipartisan efforts. It is normalized
that these students go to the United States with at least some suspicion due to the
tracking apparatus and its policy roots in fears of terrorism from Americans and
its leaders.
CONCLUSION
While there could be reasonable expectations for governments to account for and
process foreign visitors, such as visa overstays, international students have been
particularly labeled with distrust through these measures. After 9/11, there was
increased scrutiny on the possible security threat of international students
enrolling in U.S. institutions, but the fears also appear to be unfounded. In an
analysis of attacks from 1975 to 2017, Nowrasteh (2020) found, “The annual
chance of being murdered by a foreign-born terrorist who entered on a student
visa is 1 in 72,838,750 per year during the 43-year period.” These odds are lower
than that of the native-born population, due to the likelihood of violence
committed by local networks such as other family members (Harrell, 2012).
International students at large, then, have been scapegoated as suspected terrorists.
High-profile attacks have come to define the mistrust of the entire group, which
was present before Trump, inflamed under his presidency, and will remain with
the Biden administration and beyond.
While this work has added to the understanding of international students and
security, it was limited by its scope common with this type of historical design
(see Cameron, 2006; Kim, 2009; Stein & McCartney, 2021). Future research of
public opinion surrounding the perceived security threats would be useful, such
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as large-scale opinion surveys, as it would be telling to understand the evolution
of American perceptions of international students and visa processes through
longitudinal data. Likewise, this research focused on the contention of terrorism
as a threat, but international students have also been painted as an economic threat,
especially in recent years (Castiello-Gutiérrez & Li, 2020; Rose-Redwood &
Rose-Redwood, 2017). Future exploration of a similar nature to this work should
consider how this economic threat evolved and connected with federal policy. The
so-called China Threat is only growing within American discourse (Lee & Haupt,
2021), but there were similar concerns with the rise of Japan in the 1980s. The
political connections between the economic concerns would be a valuable
companion to this study on terrorism threats, as the former has garnered much
more focus from the political right in recent years.
In consideration of the incremental tracking of foreign students in the United
States, the recent scrutiny placed on these populations and other outsiders could
be seen along a continuum. The nativism or unwelcoming rhetoric toward
international students and foreigners that has bubbled up during the past decade
is a continuation of past legacies toward these students and the larger immigration
population. Eventually, students from places that have been particularly targeted
such as China or predominantly Muslim countries may choose not to come to the
United States for study (Allen & Ye, 2021; Castiello-Gutiérrez & Li, 2020).
Universities and educators must continue to fight and protect this population from
misplaced speculation and scapegoating. Even if security fades from the popular
discourse, this research has shown that it can come in waves, as it is baked into
the history of American immigration and higher education. While international
students have brought recognized talents to the United States, national sentiments
have also coupled the population as security threats.
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